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When Anaxagoras developed his philosophy in. the middle of the 
fifth century B. C., th e objects of sense perception were under 
attack. Heraclitus had denounced the 1Nea kness of sense perception 
and called upon men to observe his logos which was both an aci;ount 
or explanation of the universe and the principle according to which 
it was organized. Parmenides separated being from the sensibles 
and argued that the latter were objects of opinion rather than of 
knowledge. Erotagoras went even further. If we are to use Plato's 
�£�££1�11.!.§. as evidence, he argued that the sensibles were relations. 
They were relative to each percipient and even to the condition of 
a percipient at a particular moment. Since individuals h ad different 
sensations of the same object, the object itself did not have the 
qualities attributed to it. If one person said that something was 
hot, and another that it was cold, it was neither hot nor cold . 
The &rgument may have been applied to entities as well as to 
sensi'bles. As Aristotle wrote (�. 1007bl8-26), if an entity 
seemed to one person to be a trireme, it was a trireme; if it 
seemed. to be a wa.11, it was a wall. 
Could objects of sense perception be equated with being, without 
'breaking any part of Parmenides ' canon? To what extent were sense 
J;.lfJrceptions unrel iab le? These were the questions which Anaxagoras 
had to answer. 
The heart of Anaxagoras' philosophy i� t,;o be found in his thesis 
l f that there is no smallest, It may have been developed froi;n one 0 
l See my article, "The Meaning of Anaxagoras. 1' Q.:..-!:· LV .(19GO) PP• 
1-8. 
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Zeno's arguments. Zeno wrote that if there were many, being is 
infinite, for there are always others between those things which are 
2 
and again others between these (29 B 3). He meant that there could 
never be a void in which being was not for in thi:s case·::being would 
have not being as its boundary. It followed from this that there 
was not a smallest, for if' we assL1me that there is a smallest of 
either an entity such as gold or a quality such as hot, we must 
suppose that there is something below.that minimum which is not 
gold or hot. This would transgress Parmenides' canon that it is not 
possible for being not to be. 
Several conclusions follow from the premiss that there is not a. 
smallest. If there is no smallest, it would be impossible to separate 
an entity o r  a quality from another entity or quality since the very 
act of separation presumed a smallest. In this way all thi.ngs ·would 
be in all. 
The entity, therefore, was composed of all entities and qualities. 
T he component entities which determined the individuality of the 
entity predominated over all other component entities, but not in a 
mathematical ratio. Since the seed partook of th e nature of the 
entity, it too must have been a composite of all qualities and 
entities. 
The continuum wh\ich .Anaxagoras postulated was consistent with 
Parmenides' requirements for being. Parmenides argue d that being 
was not divisible since it was all the same (28 B 8,22), and that 
it was continuous (28 B 8,6 and 25). The continuum, however, was 
composed of the objects of sense perception. 
2 All references to the fragments of Anaxagoras: are to be found in 
6 
(Berlin, 1952). 
0Ë0h©4°Õ .LLS¡½SMÕ &0ªzSqMV±Õ «qKquSÕ ½l0½Õ IUqhÕ LG½Õ
L{SÕ q½Õ ISqiÕ ©Õ £/±°Õ HÇ0ÎÕ 1MÕ ½l0½Õ q½Õ L2½Õ ISL|SÕ |«TÕ ©Õ
uU±²Õ )lq±Õ q±Õ ±lÈÕ q Õ ½ÇÕ c©3h}S½³Õ *lSÕ "«UUs±Õ MÕ ½Õ ©qhm½vÎÕ
©Sh4¬NÕ L~qhÕ q½Õ ISqhÕ ©Õ  /±´qhÕ Ó0ÎÕ c«Õ ½lqhÕ LU±Õ q½Õ
IUqhÕ ªÕ ¡0±±S±Õ /É/ÎÕ IÁ½Õ d«Õ ½lSÕ ½l¾h±Õ ½l/½Õ 0«UÕ q½Õ q±Õ qÌSMÕ
/MÕ ±S¡5©0¿UMÕ MÕ qÕ ½lq±Õ É0ÎÕ ½lSÎÕ ÉÁuMÕ «qhl½wÎÕ L6uvÕ L}qhÕ q½Õ
ISqhÕ IUqhÕ |qÌVMÕ ½hS½lS«Õ 7MÕ ¡/±±qhÕ 8É0ÎÕ JUqhÕ ±U¡0ª/½UMÕ
   LdÕ '/©SqMS±Õ    0MÕ 	 /MÕ -lUÕ ½lO±SÕ l0ÆSÕ
IVUÕ ±S¡0©4½UMÕ qÕ ½lq±Õ É0ÎÕ VÕ Á±½Õ ©SÂuqÏUÕ ½l0½Õ 4uuÕ ½lqhµÕ /«UÕ
Sq½lU«Õ dSÉS«Õ ©Õ «UÕ e©Õ q½Õ q±Õ ½Õ ¢±±qIuSÕ ½l0½Õ ½lU©UÕ ±lÁwMÕ IUÕ
{«SÕ ½l0Õ 0uw	Õ IÁ½Õ 0uuÕ ½lqh¶Õ /«SÕ S§Á9uÕ    LcÕ (1®|UqMW±Õ  
 
 
!q©½lÕ Mq·±uÁ½qÕ h©É½lÕ /MÕ 
	 cÕ ¨Á0uq½ÎÕ ÉU«SÕ 0vuÕ
SÌ¡u0qUMÕ qÕ ½U¯±Õ dÕ LIq:½qÕ 0MÕ ±U£0©0½qÕ /Ë/h©;±Õ 0¸±qjUMÕ
 ½lXÕ ¡©q0SÆ/uÕ L±qLÕ qÍ½Á«SÕ ½lSÕ L¹qLÕ ¡¡±q½U±Õ ½lSÕ }q±½Õ
 
M©ÎÕ ½lYÕ É/©Õ uMÕ /PÕ ½lVÕ J©qkn½Õ /MÕ ½lUÕ l½Õ U<©½lÕ 0MÕ ½lZÕ
±[VM±Õ    #eÕ ½lSÕ lÎ¦½lU±q±Õ $Õ l/ÆUÕ ±½/½UMÕ q±Õ L©«SL½Õ ½lUÕ
S0LlÕ dÕ ½l\Õ ½l«S]Õ 	 {Á±½Õ l/ÆSÕ L½/qUMÕ ½lSÕ ½oU«Õ ½ÇÕ I½lÕ
ISd©SÕ /QÕ 0f½SªÕ ½lSÕ ±U¡/©=½qÕ ,lSÕ ½lSÕ Á±Õ L0Á±UMÕ ½lSÕ qÍ½Á©UÕ
½Õ ©SÆuÆUÕ ½lSÕ £0¬½±Õ IUL0SÕ ±S¡0«>½SMÕ    0MÕ  )lUÕ
±S¡/©0½qÕ ÃS4½Õ ½l?½Õ ±|VÀlqjÕ qÕ Él^lÕ 8Õ S½q½ÎÕ «Õ ¨Á0vq½ÎÕ
¤«SMq@½SMÕ ÆSªÕ 0vuÕ ½lS©Õ U½q½qS±Õ /MÕ ¨Á/wq½q_ºÕ L½/qUMÕ qÕ q½Õ

A»Ô£©UÒ¼`½g­rb£%pyaÕ $Õ ½lSÕ ±£S©Õ l0q«Õ /qv±Õ ÆUq±Õ 0«½S©qU±Õ
±qSÊ±Õ 0MÕ IS±Õ ÇlqLlÕ ÇU©SÕ 0½Õ cq©±½Õ Á±UUÕ IUL0Ä±UÕ cÕ ½lUq©Õ
±|BuuS±±ÑÕ qL«S0±SMÕ qÕ ±qÐSÕ CRÕ h©DMÅ/xuÎÕ JULE|UÕ ±U¥F©/½UMÕ e«Õ
 +Õ ½lS±SÕ ÎÕ IVÕ /MMUMÕ ½lSÕ ½lqLtÕ 0MÕ ½lSÕ ©0©SÕ    /MÕ  
4 
one another (59 B 10). Birth, therefore, took place when the mixture o f  
the components was such that the entity about to be realized 
predominated in it, and death was the dissolution of the mixture 
and the return of the components to the mass. 
Growth was due to the addition of parts, similar to those which 
predominated in the entity, from the nourishment which the entity 
received. For example, as Aristotle wrote, bread contnined flesh, 
bones, veins, sinews, hair, nails an d wings, and water possessed 
wood, bark and fruit (59 A 45,15-18). The awkwardness is, of course, 
due t o  the fact that Anaxagoraw did not have the concepts of 
potentiality and actuality. To say that bones and fl esh are in the 
bread was his way of explaining the fact that bread is potentiallf 
bones and flesh. The problem for Anaxagoras was to explain why 
wood was not edible, or why flesh was not in the wood. Fle sh was, 
as a matter of fact, in the wood, but iln so small a portion that 
it could not contribute to the growth of flesh. 
Change of quality was likewise explained in terms of th e mixture 
and separation which takes place within the entity (59 A 52). 
Since anything which shared in the mixture permeated the whole, 
Anaxagoras carefully separated his nous from th e cosmos. ''Mind,'' he 
wrote, "is infinite and self-ruling and not mixed vrith anything, 
but it is alone by itself. For if it were not by itself, but had 
been mixed with something else, it would have &bared in all things, 
if it had been mixed with anything ( 59 B 12). '' We might notice also 
that mind is never an object of sense perception and th e mixture was 
composed onl¥ of such objects. In this way Anaxagoras made a 
5 
considerable advance over Heraclitus since Heraclitus' logos was. 
identified with the fiery process by which one opposite was 
exchanged for another (22 B 90). 
From the thesis that there was no smallest followed the unity of 
opposites, In my earlier a.�ticle, I argued that large and small 
were inseparable because they were infinite in degree. The same 
conclusion appears to hold true for th e cosmie opposites. Anaxagoras 
write!i', "Things in the cosmos have not been separated from one 
another nor has the warm been cut of f from the cold with an axe 
nor the cold from the w�rm ( 59 B 8)." 
v.re can infer that the opposites whiah were cosmic were found in 
entities ulso. � piece of iron, for instance, could be hot or cold. 
Presumably the hot and the cold were though t to mix with the iron. 
Both Heraolitus and Anaxagoras accepted the reality of the world 
, ·  
of s ense perception an d turned their attention to the principles 
inherent in it. But warring opposites, restrained by a limit or 
logos, and being exchanged each for the other, were much too 
p rimitive fo r Anaxagoras. He saw, by a stroke of genius, th at the 
opposites were one becaus e there was no smallest, and that they 
were consequently infinite in degree and inseparable. 
More light on the opposites is found in another fragme nt of 
Anaxagoras in which he wrote, "To itself each is both large and 
small (59 B 3)." As I pointed out in my earlier article, the 
' (. , 
d't 
antithesis o f  'l'f'o� <:�vro is, of course,itY'o'� 9\..1.l.,•. Anaxagoras 
was arguing thatJ.while every entity is small or large when compared 
with another entity, when no comparison is made the entity is both 
large and small. Similarly, an entity would be both sweet and bitter. 
From this pass age we can inf�r .Anaxagoras' an�Ner to Protagoras. 
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The opposites and the qualities were existents, and not, as 
Protagoras h ad believed, relations. They were not relative to the 
percipient. Perhaps Anaxagoras might have argued also that an 
entity if it seemed to be a tri�eme to one person and a wall to 
another 'Pas both a trireme and a wall., 
In two passages Anaxagor as uses black and white as examples. In 
one he argued that snow was blacl\:. Snow was frozen ·w·ater, and 
water was black; therefore, snow also was black (59 A 97). Elsewhere 
he stated that we are not able to judge th e truth because of the 
weakness of our sense perceptions. He illustrated this by taking 
l � two colors, ba�ck and white, and pouring one into the other drop 
by drop. The sight, he said, could not di stinguish the gradual 
change of coror • . These statements illustrate the inseparability of 
the opposites, black and white, and the weakness of sense perception. 
Sense perception was unreliable because, although an entity had 
both opposites, the senses could distinguish only one. 
It is possible also that Anaxagoras found unity in the parts of 
the spectrum. He refered to the seeds as h aving all kinds of shapes, 
colors and flavors (59 B 4). Although it is possible from the wording 
of the Greek to infer that eo.ch seed had on e shape, color and flavor, 
I do not think that this is what is meant. The experiment which was 
made by pouring black and white into each other drop by drop could 
be made with adjacent colors in the spectrum, such as blue and green 
or orange and red, and the result would have been similar. It could 
be infe�d. and, I believe, was infe�d by Anaxagoras, although 
there is no evidence for this, that each color was in ever y other 
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the primaev�l separation, but played no part in the numerous 
separations which take place as each animal '�d plant 0omes'to birth. 
As Socra tea complained in the fil1�
 
• . Anaxagoras did not make any use 
,·.! 
of his nous at all. 
Man possessed a sense perception whic h was weak and inadequate, but 
by observation and analogy from the sense objects he could draw some 
conclusions about those things which were not clear (59 B 2la). 
Induction and deduction we�e available fo r him, as they were to 
Anaxagoras in the construction of his system. 
To conclude, then, Anaxagoras held that the objects of sense 
perception, both entities and qualities, were existents, and not 
rela�ive to the percipient, and that they formed a continuum which 
observed the criteria of Parmenides' being. Birth, dissolution, growth 
and change of quality were explained in terms of combination and 
separation. The opposites were inseparable and infinite in degree, and 
the parts of the spectrum were one. The opposites were used to. account. 
for sense perception as well as fo r pleasure and pain. Since animals 
and plants are all the product o f  the same natural process, they are 
essentially alike. Man lives in a world whioh ha'3 no purpose and no 
god, but, by means of observation, experience and analogy he is able 
to draw some conclusions about the kind of world in which he lives and 
about his own nature. Although Anaxagoras' thesis left many proble�, 
it wa.s perhaps one of th e most brilliant solutions in Presooratic 
philosophy. 
Margaret E. Reesor . 
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